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4.  Gioom.AL  CONCLUS~ON 1 
'!he  teclmological  problans  of  safety  of  nuclear  installations  are 
treated  by  the  Ccmni.ssion  in the  frane  of  the  Council  Resolution  of 
22.07.75.  In 1987,  in its :report c:cJ.I(87>96  (1) the Ccmni.ssion reviewed 
the .i.nplem:mtati6n of this Resolution after around ~lve  years. 
'!he  ~rk was  carried out mlln.ly  in the field of nuclear p:::liNer  plants 
<NPPs) I  and  particularly  for  those  with  Light  water  Reactors  (l..WR) 
<which generate a  daninant part of electricity of nuclear origin in the 
Carrmmity>  and  those  with Liquid Metal  Fast  Breeder Reactors  <I.MFBR> 
(for  which  developrent  and  denonstration  ~rks are  going  on  in  the 
Carrmmi  ty)  0 
'!he actions undertaken by the Carrnission in this field aimad nai.nly at 
bringing  out  a  consensus  between  the  safety  authorities,  the  p:::liNer 
plants designers and  constructors and the electricity producers of the 
nanber states on the objectives and nethcx:is used to assu:re and evaluate 
the safety of r.m  and IMFBR  power plants at the design stage and during 
their operation. 
A first step in this field was  the publication in 1981  (2)  of a  set of 
fundanental  and  general  safety principles  for  I..WR  p:::liNer  plants which 
can also be applied to IMFBR. 
Since that t.ine,  the experience acquired in the design and operation of 
NPPs  has  increased  as  well  as  the  understanding  of  C:crrplex  I:hysical 
phenomena  as  those  occurring  in  accidental  situations.  Both 
technological  prog:ress  and  .i.nproved  understanding  allCM  the  constant 
.i.nprovem:mt of plant safety. 
The safety of a  nuclear plant like the safety of any C:crrplex industrial 
process  depends  on  nany  factors  throughout  its  existence  and,  IrOSt 
particularly during its design and operation stages. 
'!he  developnents  recorded  in  the  last  few  years  have  allc::Med  to 
systematize  the  analysis  methods  and  to  prog:ress  in  the  study  of 
accidents  of  very  la:  probability  but  whose  consequences  oould  be 
seve:re.  '!his  allCMS  to  assess  systematically the  safety of  NPPs  by 
neans of proven nethcx:is. 
Safety evaluation of  NPPs  was  one of the areas identified in the last 
chapter  of  the  d.octmwant  c:cJ.I(81>519  as  suitable  for  further 
developrents. 
As  a  follow  up,  the  present  docurrent  gives  a  description  of  safety 
objectives  and  nethcx:is  used  in the  Carrmmity in the twJ  particularly 
.i.nportant  a:reas  of  design  and  operation  for  the  1m  and  the  IMFBR 
nuclear power plants. 
1>  CXM(87>96 
"Teclmol<XJical Problans of Nuclear Safety" 
2)  c:cJ.I(81)519 
"Safety Principles for Light water Reactor Nuclear~  Plants" 2 
2 .1. GENERALITIES 
Nuclear  safety  is  "the  achievenent  of  pn:>per  operating  cx:md.itions, 
prevention  of  accidents  or  mitigation  of  accident  ~ces, 
resulting in protection of site personnel,  the general public and  the 
env.ironnent  fran  undue  radiation  hazards"  (as  defined  in  the  safety 
d0Cl.n'IEI1ts  of the IAEA> • 
·Consequently  the  safety  of  nuclear  ~  plants  is  based  on  a 
f1.ll'ldanen.tal  principle  of  radiation  protection  and  implenented  in 
technological safety principles. 
'!he  link  between  the  technological  safety  principles  and  the 
radiological  ones  has  been  :recently  emphasizerl  by  INSllG  <  3 > in its 
report on  "Basic Safety Principles for NPPs" • 
In  on:ier  to  avoid  radiation  hazaxd  fran  operating  NPPs  and  generate 
electricity with  m.inimum  risk,  the  following  three  safety  fnnctions 
ImlSt be fulfilled in all nollllal. and accidental conditions: 
- the mJClear chain reacti.cn llllSt he rmt:mlled 
- the heat fran the core llllSt he :reDDVed 
- the radi  oacti:ve fi ssiat pmducts llllSt he CDlfi.ned in the plant 
In view of the magnitude of the pot:ent.ial :risk fran such installations 
and  hence  the  stringency  of  the  measures  to  be  taken  in oz:der  to 
achieve a  satisfactory level of safety,  designers  cn:e  pranpte:i to use 
"nethods"  adapted  to the  status of  the projects  and  to the state of 
Jmowledge,  such  nethods  being  inspired by the basic  p:>Stulation:  the 
nore  serious  cn:e  the  amsequences  for  the  public  of  an  accidental 
event,  the  lc:Mer  ImlSt  be  the  proh3bi  1 i :ty of  occurrence  of  such  an 
event. 
Hence the ~  tactors on which the "nethods"  can have an influence cn:e: 
- prevention  of  an  accident,  or  failing  that,  reduction  in  the 
probability of its occu.n:ence; 
limitation  of  the  consequences  of  an  accident  that  may  occur  in 
spite of preventive neasures, in other \I.Unis mitigat.iat. 
'l11ree  "nethods"  based  on  the  principles  set  out  above  and  of 
CC~Iplemmtary  nature  have  been  thus  developed:  the  detenninistic 
nethod,  the  probabilistic  nethod  <those  tw:>  nethods  usually  closely 
linked> ,and the systanatic use of operating experience to bring out the 
weak points of the plants and correct them to reduce the risk.  It is 
important to note that these different nethods ImlSt  always take aCCX)W'lt 
of  an  "AIARP"  concept  (As  IDW  As  Reasonably  Practicable>  to lay down 
limits to the safety measures, without which the installations would be 
impossible to construct and  operate,  fran both the  technical  and  the 
econanical points of view. 
3>  INSAG:  "International Nuclear Safety .Advisory GJ::oup"  to the IAFA 
Director General 3 
'!his AIARP  CXJncept  is implanented in each Marb:!r State, by the safety 
a'l:lthority in charge of CXJntrolling the NPPs at all stages of their life 
starting with siting and including design,  oonstruction,  oc:mnissioning 
and operation. 
It should  also  be  adde:::l  that  the awareness  of the carplexity of  the 
];ilysical ];ilenarena which play a  .role in nuclear plants has always been 
the noti  vation of i.np:Jrtant theoretical and experinental studies which 
lead  to  a  better  knowledge  of  the  ocnservative  DBrgins  used  for 
~tion, and · of  the  exact  nature  of  physical  and  radiological 
COflSEGU.ences  of the accidents taken into aCCOWlt. 
Finally,  the  ~rtance ·of  the  inman  factor  is  to  be  recogniZEd. 
·  Cont.rol ·of  the  quality of  design and  construction by fomal  ()lality 
Assurance procedUres is required. 
2. 2.  ,DEI'ERMINISTIC MEl'HOO 
2. 2 .1.  Introduction 
'!his nethod CXJnSists  in. setting up "a priori" a  number of defense lines 
be't:llleen  ~ctor Q:>re  and  envi.ronment  and in applying  the  •defense in 
depth• ttta4JL  <as  defined in cx:M<81>519>  to verify that they are able 
to ~  with the different nonnal  and  accident:.  conditions; it is used 
prillarily at  the  design  stage  and  neoessitatt!S  the  incorporc,ttici'l  of 
safety lllal:gins  in ·  t:.M  structure .  design and of c:onse;rvative ,.factors in 
the ·calculation of radiological oonsequenoes of accidents.  · 
As  .far  as.  possible  structm:es  are  designed . and  ~saz:y material 
chosen .in such a  'WaY  that safety margins. are inhei:ent in the plant.  . 
:,nus ~  analyses  the  :OOrriers  placed  between  the  fuel  and  the 
f311Vil:OJ nueut  and  lists  the  acx:i dent  sit:uat.ials  roth  of  intel:nal  am 
~  origin to be  taken into account in the cle$ign.  A  n~  ·  c'f 
barriers is foreseen in acco:rdance to the AIARP  principle. 
1he barriers between reactor fuel and envil:o.rno:mt are the nuclear fuel 
cladc:ling,  :the  prim:uy  pressure  boundary  CXJntaining  the  core  and  ~ 
coo].ant, the reactor CXJnt:ai.nrrent  building.  Barriers .  are also instc\1~~ 
in  associated  buildings  where  radioactive  materials  nay. be  haridltad 
and)  or stora::i.  . 
Design  basis  accidents  coveri;ng  diffei:ent  soenarlos  are  selected  in 
omer  to  prove  the  fulfillment  of  the  furrlamental  safety  functioris 
Wlder different accidental situations.  '!bey .are chosen in such a  ~Y 
as  to  have  an  envelope  character for  a  gzoup of  fault conditions ·~f 
similar characteristics.  ' 
'!be  "defense in depth"  concept copes with such situations as follaws: 
designing,  CXJnStructing and operating the equiprent in such a  way as 
to inpart intrinsic strength to the installation; 
equipping  the  installation  with .  cont.rol  and  p.rotection  systans 
capable  of  restoring it to its noma!  operating conditions  in all 
cases of anticipated transients and incidents; 4 
- taking into accamt, despite the preventive measures :refen:ed to in 
the  two  pt:eeeding  points,  of  accidents  that  a:re  pt:eSUI1Bi  to  be 
possible  and  designing  safety  systems  capable  of  mitigating  the 
consequences  of  such  accidents  and  retuming  the  plant  to  safe 
conditions. 
2. 2. 2.  '!be barriers 
~ large  international oonsensus  exists  for the establishrrent of th~ 
~i~  and  their  objectives  were  already defined  in  the  ciocurrvap.t 
OOM<81>519.  . 
.  . 
1 -''lhe  ffrst mrrier canprises  the retaining ability of the fuel matrix 
and·  .the fuel cl.addi.ng.  ·  ;: 
It is  esSential  to  ensure  the  integrity of  this  barrier;  the:refo1=9 
:reJJJml~ coOling of the co:re airl :reactivity cxmtrol nust ·be provided ~ 
limi:t  t.he  . fuel  and  cladcU ng  temperatw:e  during  nonial  operati~, 
anti'~pated operational occun:ences  such  as  transients and in acciderlt 
oonditions.  t 
In-addition,  :reliable: maans  Itl.lSt  be pnwided to renove  :residu li heat 
after _shut down to pr$;erve the integrity of the fuel elerents.  ": 
"'.Ibe  seaDl  terrier is ·the  Prinary  pressure  boun::lai:y:  within  ~s 
barrier the heat pnxiuction and the heat excharige take place.  --~ 
'!his barrier prevents the escape of any radioactive materials which ~ 
present iri the cooling fluid.  IDss of integrity of this barrier lea<;t:s 
to a  loss of coolant, which ii1 tum might lead to a  failure of the ~1 
cladcli.itg.  Provisions a:re therefore necessary to. limit the consequ~ 
of the fai_lw:e of the sec::on9.  barrier.  "  , 
D.Ie  to the importance of this barrier the pt:Obability of failure m.:ust 
be kept very low and.,  as .a consequence,  material,  design,  fabricati~ 
and construction a:re to be of highest quality, e.g. :  :! 
l  i  .  j  .. 
ItBde  following  specific  validated  cOdes  and  subject  · to  411 
extenSive prog:i:aime of qtiality assurance;  ,, 
allowing in-seivide inspection' and nan-destructive testing. 
A  particW.ar  attention. is to be  giVen  to the  steam generators  <~ 
ag>licable>  to avoid as  far as possible tube failure and tube ~ 
~tion.  1 
"~  t:h.iDi barrier is oonstituted by the ccnt:a.innent  system.  Its maip 
funC;tion  is to mitigate the  consequences  of an  escape of  radioactive 
materials  fn:m  the  primary  ci.rcult  and  to  limit the  escape of  these 
materials into ~  envi.rorment. "  · 
'!his barrier being the last between radioactive content of the co:re ~ 
the  p.tblic  is  designed  to  withstand  a  design  msis  accident.  '!he 
behaviour  of  the  cx:nt.ainm:mt  in  case  of  a  m:>:re  severe  accident  l;s 
presently being studiErl in the camun.ity.  ·~ 
'!he particular importance of this barrier has  lErl to the need to verify 
its  :resistance  not  only  to  internal  hazams,  rut  also  to  external 
hazards as will be seen in the following paragraphs. 5  ; 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  barrier  concept  involves  not  only  the 
"barrier"  itself,  rut also includes  procErlures  and  systans  which  are 
·necessary for the barrier to function satisfactorily. A <jood  example of 
this is the third barrier which ensures  oontai.nnent:  this cont:a.inm:mt 
is ensured,  not only by the contai.rJIIelt building,  but also by internal 
·structures ~s well as ventilation and filtration systems. 
2 .  ~. 3.  '!he accidental situations 
'Ihese situations can be classified in three classes: 
- design tasis conditions 
- internal hazards 
_'  external hazards 
2. 2. 3 .1.  Design J:::asis  conditions 
'lhese ,are .  the set of operational states and anticipat.Erl  transieri,ts of 
incidehtal  or  accidental  nature  that  are  taken  into  accamt  for 
equipflent  and  structural  design;  they can  be classified accordi!tg  to 
different cri  ter.l:.a. 
For  the  IHlR,  the  d.cx:tment  CCMC81>519  fin.:il  classifies  those  events, 
according to their fra;[Uency: 
a>  Events  <operational  occun:ences)  with m::x:ierate  frequency,  MY  of 
which IMY  occur in eyery nuclear p::?Wer  plant several tirr'es during 
plant life. 
Due  to the· presence of protective neans in the plant, these events 
do not escalate into situations 'Where  the prescribed yearly dose 
limits  <operational  limits>  are  exceeded,  although  duririg  short 
pericds of time the nonnal exposure levels might be exceeded. 
Examples of J:X>Stulate:i  events are: 
- IDss of noonal feed water 
- Partial loss of core coolant flow 
- 'lbtal loss of load arrl/or turbine trip 
- IDss of off-site power. 
b>  Events or fault se:}Uences  whidt nay occur during the life tine etf 
part  . cular . 1  ·¥  a·~  .p  ant.  ·1 
OUe  to the presence of protective neans in the plant,  these even~ 
or  fault  sequences  are not  expected to escalate  into. situatio¥ 
'Where  external countenreasures to protect the public are necessary 
other  than  for  instance  on  a  precaution.azy  basis  a  m:mitOririg 
prog:canne  <with  respect  to  focxistuffs>,  although  the  prescribed 
yearly dose limits for nonnal operation might be exceeded. 
An exanple of· :postulated events is: 
- loss  of  pr.inal:Y  reactor  coolant  fran  a  small  ruptm:ed  pipe qf 
such an extent as  to prevent nornal  reactor shut down  and  ccx:)i 
down,  assuming make up is provided by ncmna.l  make up only.  \ 
; C) 
6 
Events  or  fault  sequences  not  expectOO  to  occur  during  ~e 
lifetilre  of  a  ])articular  plant,  rut, ~  occurrence  JOs 
nevertheless considered in the design. 
Due to the presence of protective means  in the plant, these 
events  or  fault  sequences  are  not  expected  to  escalate  blto 
situations  where  extensive off--site  cxruntemeasuz:es  are ~ 
to protect the p.lblic.  .  1 
An example of postulata:i events is: double ended break of a  ·~ 
pipe in the pr.inary preSSUI:e boundal:y.  .  i: 
Such ~ts  or fault sequences are used e.g. for the desigri of -t;pe 
cantai.rment.  : 
For IMFBR  t.hose events  ha.Je  been  classified acco:r:ding  to the  sys~ 
affecte:i arii in particular:  ~ 
' 
cO  Co:re  reactivity faults 
- Ineorrect withdrawal of absorbers 
-'Ejection of absorbers 
- Co:re  loading errors 
- Incp:ess of oold sodium to oo:re 
- Addition of m::xierator . 
....:  Voiding by gas 
.J Variation of oore CX>llfiguration 
b) ·  General c:odllinq accidents 
' 
.:.  Primai:y pmnp  failure or loss of power supply 
- Failure in operation of valves in primai:y ooolant circuits' 
- IDss of pr.inary SOdium 
- leak in the intenre:tiate heat exchangers 
- Failuies in the mai.il  systans  for rercoval of heat flXIIl  the 
pr~  circuit  · 
- Failui:e of oore ooolant supply structures 
- Malfurtction of decay heat raooval 
c)  Sub-ass€.mbly faults 
- Inoorrect positioning of a sub-assanbly 
- Inlet and outlet· blOckages in a  sub-assanbly 
- IDeal blOckage or oooliilg defects within sub-asSE!I'blies 
- FUel pin failure 
- WraJ;Per  · failure 
- Damage pri>pagation within sub-assembly and oore 
2.2.3.2.  Internal hazards 
In  addition  to the  above-nentioned  design  basis  CX>Irlitians,  internal 
hazards  which  could  lead to failure of  safety systans  <in particular 
• x "'"  n  cause  failures)  have  to  be  cxmside:red  in  the  design  of 
cantainnent  building  and  srne  necu:by  auxili.ai:y  buildings.  In  this 
oonteXt,  the internal missiles,  high  E!l"lenJY  piping ruptures,  in~ 
floods and fires are taken into account. 7 
2 . 2. 3. 3.  External hazaros 
'!he  external  hazards,  both  natural  and  man-made,  which  are  analyz¢ 
and, ~  appropriate,  taken intri account in the .  design basis  studi~ 
for NPPs  include:  ~ 
events  of  natural  origin:  earthquakes,  continental  and  coastal 
flocx:is,  waves,  ext.I:a1e neteorological conditions. 
events  causa:i by man-ilade activities: aircraft crashes,  accidents 
arising  fran  industrial  activities  and  hazanious  materials 
trans{X:lrt  (explosions, fire, toxic gases> . 
missile ejections e.g. fran possible turbo generator failw:e. 
Such .  external  events are considered. in either a  detenninistic manner, 
or  by  probabilistic  techniques  as  appropriate  and  following  tJ;le 
national practices.  i) 
Anothet kirrl of  ~..xtemal  hazani is sabotage.  Mea.sm:eS  are  generall-y 
taken  in the Manlj::er  States to pmtect the NPPs  l::ut  this point is oot 
t.I:eatecl at Ccmmmity level.  1· 
'  2. 2.  4.  Safety systems 
Reactor safety systems lJhich initiate actions to prevent safety limits 
being  exceeded  are  designed by applying the ,single failure crit:eric:Yf.-
'lhey are hence redundant and capable of perfonni.ng· their function  Unci~ 
the  various  operating  conditions  considered.· for  the  design.~  ac:courit 
being taken of one single failure.  · 
D.u;ing  :reactor  operation,  situations  do,  however,  arise  in  whicrJl 
reclundancy can be reduced or lost, and rreasures should be taken to ~ 
with them fran the safety standpoint.  '
1 
'lhese situations are: 
IOl--aVai..labity  of  equi.piEnt  because  of  maintenance  or ~; 
work,  z:esul.ting in situations in which :recil.JOOancy is reduced  ··1 
Olllin\  cause/nllllnt  DDde  failures,  which  can  z:esul.t · in  ~ 
sinultaneous loss of supposedly indeperrlent systans,  including~ 
total loss of a  redundant  system,  no matter what  the  redundan<f 
may be.  ·  I:( 
2. 2. 4. i. Hit-availability of equiptent 
lbl-avcrllabi:lity of equipoont  may  be  either pl.an:nErl  (maintenance)  Of 
the  ~t  of  a  breakdown.  '!here  are  several  'Nays  of  ex>ping  with 
situations of this type by neasures taken at the design stage or duririg 
operation: 
a>  At  the  design  stage,  the  system's  degree  of  redundancy  can  be 
~~"·  increased  so as  to  allow  necessary  reprlr work  to be carried out 
.  '·'"''  during operation without loosing the required redundancy. 8 
Increasing a  safety systan'  s  redundancy,  i.e. add..iri.g,  in parallel, 
mtifOilents capable of perfoz:ming the sane fnnction  (pumps,  valves, 
etc  ...  >  ,  decreases the probability of failure of that systan.  No 
intemational  consensus  has  yet  been  :reached,  however,  an  the 
advantage  gained,  in the  case  of  a  given  systan,  by  incJ:eeising 
rerlurxlancy of the systems. 
:rndea:l,  the limited advantages gained fran such an increase can be 
offset by the increas~ canplexity of the installation. 
Other nethoclS are hence saretines awlied in order to increase the 
reliability of such systems: 
- equipnent  diversification  arrl  physical  separation  to. avoid 
mtliOll nnd.e  failures. 
- mutual assistance bet\lt1een several existing systems. 
(  ; 
T'1ese  rret.hcxls,  of  course,  also  have  their  drawbacks  e.g.  less 
independence between systems in the second example. 
I 
b>  Adequate operating rules can be laid down such that, in the event of 
non-availability  of  safety  equipnent,  the  safety  level  is  not 
significantly z:eduoed in mnparison with the case of full a:JU.ipnent 
availability.  Such rules could inciude the :requi.ratent to return to 
a  safe shut.d.own state within a  limited pericxi of tine. 
In coping with non-uvailability of equipnent,  a  choice can thus be 
made  fran  an  econanic  starrlpoint  between  design  neasures  and 
operati.rlg  z:estrictions.  As  reganls  safety,  it is riecessary  to 
en.sw:e  that the sane  level is ultimately attained in both cases; 
an overall mnparison of safety must not be limited to the design 
aspects,  rut should also take account of the rules laid down  for 
· reactor  operation  and  the  assurance  that  can  be  obtained  ~t 
operators will mnply with them. 
2. 2.  4.  2.  Calm:m cause and U:XIIIOU m::xie  failuz:es 
Taking accdllnt of the impact of extemal and intemal events on safety 
systems  is an indispensable adj\.UlCt  to re::iundancy;  single failuz:es  ()',: 
~pnent  outages can also be coped with by a  re:iurxlant design.  .., 
~cy,  h<Jr.Ever,. does  not  always  help  to  overcx;:ue, UIIIIVJ1  ~ 
failures in identical subsystems or failuz:es  due to mtllVJl causes li¥ 
external or intez:nal impacts.  Indeed,  fil:e,  flocxis, ~;  f~F 
and other st.lch hazaros are potentially capable of causing total sysbln 
le>Sses  :.  ltevention of  such  losses  is dane  by nearis  of  J;ilysical  9:: 
geographical  separation  of  systems,  diversification,  earthquake-p.t:OC).t 
desi9f1,  independence of ~lectrical power sources, etc.  i 
2. 2.  4 . 3. 'lbtal systan loss 
In addition to the above mantioned precautions,  a  :requi.ratent is nore 
and  nore  often  intJ:oduced:  to  study  the  effects  of  total  loss  of 
certain vital  systems,  such  as  heat  sink,  steam generator  feedwater 
systan, electricity supply systems, etc., and z:educe their oonsequen~ 
by neans of procedures or structural neasures as  far as is reasonably 
practicable. 
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2 . 2 . 5 .  Conclusion 
'!he  adoption of consistent  sets of design and operating conditions is 
of utnnst importance to ensure safety and this has been achieved in all 
Ma'nber· States. 
'!he detenninistic mathod is used in all the Manbe:i::"  States to design the 
NPPs  with  the  sane  OO.sic  hypothesis  and  concepts  and  with  scma 
diffemnces  stemni.ng  fran  their  inplenentaticn  <in  particular  as 
concerns  the  "ALARP"  concept>  and  fran  different  technological 
practices.  '!his  has  led  to  differences  in  sane  areas  :  contairment 
systems and protection against external hazams, and mathods applied· to 
design  the  safety  systems  <redundancy,  diversification,  {ilysical 
separation, mitigation of carm:m cause failuz:es>. 
One  should also rote that the analysis of the consequences of ·the total 
loss · of  safety  systems  or other technical  supports  <electrical ~ 
supplies  for  exanple>  lead to differing positions which ~d  benefit 
fran further in depth carq;a.rison in the future.·  · 
It is likely that nm::e  e1ttention will have to be given to beyond design 
OO.sis  nea.sures.  'Iherefore,  it 'WOUld  be appropriate to study in depth 
the following areas:  · 
safety  margins 
particularly  the 
accidents. 
allowing  structm:es  and  systems  <arrl  m::>re 
c:Ontai.nman.t}  to  survive  beyond  design  bas~s 
.• 
- rneasm:es  aVailable to assist operators in accidental situations. 
2.  3.  PROBABU.ISTIC  MEIHOD 
2.  3 .1.  IntrCx:iuction 
'Ihe probabilistic approach has been increasingly used over .  the last. l 0 
years  as  a  catplarenta.J:y  tool  for  designing  and  licensing,  so  't:h4.t 
nowadays all countries can:y out sare studies in all the headings  <.t: > 
to  (V).  ~1 
'!his nethod is used in its m::>re  general  fonn as  •prcilabi..listi .  sa.f~f 
assefiSille!at• i  to  verify  overall  safety .  consistency  and  calculate . ~ 
overall  risk,  occasionally  by  cc.rrparing . it  with  that  of  ~ 
inc:lut;trial activities.  .  1 
It i~ also applierl in certain COWltries  to validate neasm:es  interx:ied 
to reduce  the effects of  certain failures  <for exarrple,  total failure 
of  redundant  systems>  and  assign  :reliability  objectives  to  scma 
ccmpo.nents  important· to safety. 
'!his nethod is also used as a  design pi:oeedure in order to take caz:e  of 
certain  hazards  external  to  the  installations  (aircraft  crash.e$, 
explosions,  etc  ...  >  :  consequences  of  t:hose  hazards  are  evalua~ 
together with their probability of occurrence arrl, if necessary, ~ 
'protection neans are incorporated.  If the probability of such an evet\1: 
is sufficiently low this event is not taken into acrount in the desigr}i. 
II'. 
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With  the  application of  the  probabilistic method,  qualitative an:l/.or 
quantitative  probabilistic  safety objectives  have  been  introduoed 'by 
sone  . Manber  States  authorities  in  addition  to  the  exist::.t,pq 
detenni.n.istic safety requil:erielts.  Setting such objectives· is ano~ 
example  of application of  the 1\LARP  principle cited  above~  ~~ 
because of .sate specific limitations of the pl:obabilistic nethod  <e;g. · 
data uncertainties, difficulty in quantifying the htman ope:i::ator'  s  role 
in  accidents,  the  magnitude  of  o::tlllOJt-mxie  failures  that  oauld  be 
cau.se::i  by  fire  or  flocding,  etc  .•• >,  these  safety  objectives  have 
generallY, not been nade mandato:ry.  . 
'1he  use  of  probabilistic  studies  can  be  sub:livided  into  several 
interrelated headings: 
<i>  Reliability  analyses  - including  effects  of  redundancyi_ 
diversity,  segz:egation,  camon  Irode  failures,  and ~ 
factors; 
<ii  > Consistency  of  6verall  design ; - includ.i.ng · ccitr1on  ca~ 
effects and sYsteins  int.eracti6n;  and  ·  t 
(iii)  Ertemal haZards. 
<iv>  Feedback of_ bperating data 
(v)  Risk analysis. 
2.l.2. Reliability analyses 
Most dJUntries use reliability analyses to d:mfinn the grounds used py 
the  ~igner fo.t  choosing  certain  detemdnistic  targets.  In  tli.i.s 
zespect the reliiillility technique has  proved to be  a  substantial help 
to the, designer ih pnNtding  '} 
- the proof of a  dUfficiently lOW'  probability of failure of a  Safei-y 
system;  .  .~ 
the evi.ctence of possible weak points in the safety system; 
and allowing 
- the systematic exainination of the safety maasw:es  for coping with 
-L 
individual accident sequences; 
- the det:enni.nation  of  check  int:ei:vals  and admissible  ·  t.i.ines  mpalX  ,. 
of cx:mponents of the safety systems. 
2.  3.  3. Consistency of overall design 
Research into the reliability of all the inp:>rtant safety systsns of a 
NPP  allCMS  the designer to appreciate the intemal consistency of the 
different safety systems and to justify t.lleir design.  It is one of the 
ways  to identify potential. sources of mtroon Irode  failures,  as well as 
undesirable  systems  interactioru;  ~ch  may degrade the overall safety 
of the plant. 11 
2. 3.  4.  External hazards 
In  many  oountries  probabilistic  analyses  are  used  to  assist  in 
quantifying  the  effects  of  external  hazards  on  the  design.  '!he 
treatnent of  extemal hazards of human  origin  (e.g.  aircraft crashes, 
industrial  enviro.t  n1ent)  is  · nore  straightfoxward than the treatnent of 
natural external hazards  <e.g.  earthquakes, high winds> •  In the fozner 
case  there  is  usually  sare  representative  historical  data  and  the 
:possible  consequences  are known,  although the calculations nay not be 
very  accurate.  Hc:Jwever,  in  the  latter  case  there  is  often  little 
representative historical evidence and the likely conSequences of very 
inprobable events nay be difficult to predict.  'lhl.s often leads to the 
inclusion of conservative margins in the probabilistic estinate. 
2. 3.  5.  Feedback of operating data 
For  the  application  of  probabilistic  techniques,  data  .based  on 
operational  experience  <e.g.  CCillpOilellt  failure  rates>  are  necessaxy. 
'!his  is  an  area  of  increasing  :inp>rtance  where  co-operation  of 
utilities and designers  is vital in omer to provide as large a  data 
base as possible. 
2. 3.  6.  Risk analysis 
The  major  use  of  probabilistic  techniques  is  in  probabilistic  risk 
assessnents  <PRA>  carried  out  during  the  preparation,  and  subsequent 
confinnation, of the safety case for a  NPP.  It is usual to divide PRA 
into  three  levels:  level  1  is the identification of all the ways  in 
which  the  plant  can  malfunction  in  such  a  manner  as  to  lead  to 
potential releases of radioactive products fran the core together with 
estimates  of  the  frequency  of  those  fault  sequences;  level  2  is the 
Categorization of those emissions in teDns of size and frequency taking 
account of containnent perfonnance;  level  3  is the calculation of the 
consequences  in teons of population exposure and related consequences. 
Although  the  impetus  to  use  PRA  arose  fran  the  general  desire  to 
evaluate the overall risk fran the plant  <e.g.  in teJ::ms  of cunulati  ve 
probability distributions of late cancer deaths>,  the nain benefits to 
safety ccue fran the application of level 1  PRAs.  '!he progx:ession of 
level  2  and  level  3  PRAs  is encumbered  by calculational uncertainties 
Bnd difficulties of interpreting the significance of the results. 
Although  progress  has  been  nade  in  understanding  the  sources  of 
uncertainty in  PRAs,  sate problems  persist e.g.  the :inp>ssibility of 
finding all :possible fault sequences and the associated~  with 
a  valid  verified  awroach,  the  handling  of  ca1uon  m:xle  failures, 
extema1 hazards and human  factors. 
Most  Member  States  recognise  the  :inp>rtance  of  PRA  and  continue  to 
develop  it;  ffM  of  them  incorporate  it  in  the  fontal  licensing 
procedures. 
2. 3.  7.  '!he  use  of  PRA  techniques  in  setting  quantified  safety 
objectives 
The  task  of  quantifying  safety  objectives  is  difficult  for  various 
reasons,  the nost  important  of  which  is the uncertainty of the data 12 
used in the PRA  calculations. 
· Nevertheless  in  sare  countries  great  emphasis  is  placed  on  the 
developrent of safety objectives for the irrli.vidual and for the society 
as part of the process by which regulatory authorities and electrical 
utilities  could  provide  a  consistent  basis  for  decision  making  on 
safety. 
2. 3.  8.  Conclusion 
'!he  developrent  and  use  of  the  probabilistic  approach  is  beocming 
important within Member  States, mainly as a  cc:nplanantary tool to the 
traditional detenni.nistic approach. 
'Ihe  Catmission  is  prcnoting  the  sharing  between  Members  States  of 
experience qainErl fran its use in plant design,  safety :reviews and risk 
analysis  <and  in  the  associated  field  of  safety  objectives>. 
Intercanparison exereises a:re also organized. 
2. 4.  SYSTmATIC USE  OF  OPERATIN:;  EXPERIEOCE 
2.  4 .1.  Introduction 
'!be  detennini.stic  and  pmbabilistic  nethods  a:re  constantly  being 
improved  as  know'lErlge  is continuously  exparrlErl  through reporting  and 
analysis of  the  failures  and  incidents  that occur in the hund.l::a::is  of 
reactors in operation thmughout the world.  'Ihe  systanatic nature of 
the  "co:nections"  made in ·the wake of these events  and the increasing 
inteJ:national exchange of infonnation in this area constitute the nost 
important factor in the unranitting drive to improve safety. 
'Ihere is 1'101117  a  ~th  of world-wide experience available fran roughly 
4000  reactor.  years  of  operation  over  a  30-yaar  period  and  fran  the 
Resean:h  and  Developrent  programres  set  up  in  OI:der  to  better 
understand  the  observed  and  anticipated  phenanena.  Individual  plants 
and research facilities becx::lle  sources of valuable infonnation for many 
other  plants  in  various  countries.  At  the  sane  tine,  all  parties 
involved  in  the  protection  of  public  health  and  safety  - plant 
operating organisations, vendors and safety regulators benefit fran the 
accumulated scientific and teclmoloqical kl'l011171Erlge. 
Moreover the lessons lecu.nErl fran the analysis of severe accidents i.e. 
'IMI  and Chemobyl  a:re  taken into consideration for present and  future 
plants. 
2.  4. 2.  Reporting and analysis of p:?tential accident precursors 
Systanatic reporting and analysis of all operating incidents -even the 
minor  ones  - is  a  mr1ron  practice,  basErl  on the  awareness  that  such 
events  can  be  directly  or  indirectly  significant  for  safety e.g., 
camon  cause.  scram  unavailabilities,  power  grid  outages,  steam 
generator  tube  failures  and  feedwater  pipe  problems  in  PWRs,  relief 
pipe and pressure - suppression {XX)l  problems in BWRs. 13 
'!here is also a  general oonsensus on large-scale and tirrEly dis5E'!lli..r)a-
tion  of  infonnation  on  al::nonnal  occur.rences  as  a  contribution  '¥> 
accident prevention.  ' 
2.  4 • 3. Analysis of severe accidents 
'lhe · conclusions  reached  after  the '00  accident,  which  \EI:e  recently 
confi.DTEd through the analysis of the Chemobyl accident,  shCM  that,,  no 
matter hCM  wall  a  reactor is designed and operated,  a  severe accidE¥tt 
can never be totally ruled out.  In this situation the ultimate rea:ct,pr 
cont.ainnv:mt nay even  be  subnitted to loadings greater than the design 
Va.lue. 
'Itlat  enhanceS  even nore the  research  work  currently under wai  on the 
ultimate b9haviour of oontaimrent systems,  the cooling of noltE'n  co.reS 
and . the definition of  sou:toe  tenns. .  'lhe  aim of this  researc"l  is ·to 
achi~ a  still better understahding of the {ilenarerla.  associated witl  . 
.  severe accidents so that iteaSures can be taken to pmtect the pUblic ir!. 
· such ext.rema conditions. 
+  the  Protection  of  the  integrity  of  the  contairment  by  additi~i 
systems and,  .  ; 
- tiie diredt protection of the public bY  specific ~cy  plans  Bf.P  procechn:eS.  .  '  ..  , 
'1M.i:  ·and  CHEmOm..  seVer:e  acci~ts have  ~erlinerl the  inp".Jrtpnce  ~f 
the  cx::attairment  as  'the  ultimate  barrier  between  the  z.adioactiY.e 
inventory· of the oore and the enviroJUuent,  the necessity for  inpl:ov~ 
the:  interface  between  man-machine  (instrumentation,  opera~g 
procedures,  ergonany>  and  for  allCMing  the  operators  to  play  1:heJ:r 
essenq.al role in p:>st-accidental m:magemant,  avoiding diagnosis en:of.s 
leading  to  "WOrse  plant  conditions,  and  the  importance  of  t:lje 
"mitigaticn"  of  accidents  consequences  (e.g.  safety  actions  to 
safeguard the oont:ai.rarent  >  •  , 
<il  the other hand,  highlights  have  been  placect by those accidents ~ 
the  benefits  to  be  gainEd  f.z:an  emergency  planning  organization  mP 
training  for  operating  personnel  to gain a  "safety culture"  enabUW;J 
them· to drastically decrease the probability of severe accidents.  ·1 
2. 4.  4.  Backfittinq of operating plants am design i.mprovarents for nE\l.W 
plants as a  result of operating experienCe  t;' 
1 
Backfitting ·means  a  m:xiification  to  plant  design  acooi;ding  to  or 
required by: .  . 
-discrepancy  between  designed  and  real  plant,  due  for  instance  to 
aJ::nonnal  aging of ca:up:>nents,  or  · 
- evolution in safety requi.renents, which can lead either to additional 
features,  e.g.  for  protection against external  ca:tuon  cause events, 
or to a  si.npler design with higher quality materials,  as is the case 
for the reactor coolant circuit SUPfX'rting systan, or 
- operating incidents or accidents,  nE!W'  findings or developrents, which 
reveal  that  additional  precautions  against  damage  are  needed  for 
keeping the operational risk at a  reasonably lCM  level. 14 
In addition to the oontinuing supervision of safety perfonnance by both 
the  plant  CMner  and  the  authorities  as  well  as  plant  reexaminatiqns 
following  a  major  accident  like 'IMI,  there is a  legal  basis  in nqst 
Manber States for perfornting pericxtic safety :ooassessnents of qJerat.i,ilg 
plants.  'lhls oonsists in a  systematic c:x:nparison of plant design wi.pt 
the  existing. safety ~ts,  which  may differ fJ:an  the origu.al 
design base. 
'lb what extent the identified nm-:-oonfonili.ties have to be can:ect:e:i is 
a  practical proble:n for which pragmatic solutions a:re sought, llDStly on 
a  case-by-case basis, taki..ng aceotmt of such factors as: 
- experience with incidents and difficulties;  .. 
'- oostlbenefit oonsiderations, which lead to a  ranki.ntJ  of the envisaged 
m:X:lifications according to their relative nerit for safety;  ,. 
- possible adaptation of test and maintenance proo8dures; 
- new operating proc:edures to cope with incidents; 
:- significance of  the envisaged IOOdifications  in reducing the overall 
nuclear risk. 
'!:xamplet;  of  backfitting  resulting  fJ:an  operating  experience  are 
i11..merous.  '!hey  nnstly  concern  the  residual  heat  raroval  systems  apd 
their electrical supplies,  the +eactor coolant systan ir~tegrity,  pos~­
acci;dent qualification of equiprent and oont:.ainnent survlval in case gf 
severe accidents.  ' 
' 
It iis  generally agree;d  that  i.mpz.uvertents  to the safety of old plants  .  .  ~  ' 
haVe  to be  applied  ln  such  a  way  as  to  take  acoount  of  b::>th  tl1e 
increased  safety and  the. extra  oosts of m:xli.fications  and  pmductiqn 
losses. 
Moreover,  there should be· no undesirable consequences of m:xiificati~, 
e.g.  in~  systan  canplexity  or  important  exposure  of  plarit 
rersonnel to radiation.  ' 
Should  it tum  out  however  that  backfitting of  a  specific plant ts 
necessary,  as  opposed to desirable,  but at the sane tine is oonsicler$.i 
tcio  oostly,  then there is no  alternative left but to shut this  p~t 
down. 
2.  4·. 5.  Conclusion 
'!he  syst:atatic .use of ·experience qai.nai, fJ:an daily .operation and  frqf 
the  in-depth  analysis  of  .incidents  and  accidents  is  an  import:.ali,t 
oontribution, to the. safety of NPPs,  allowing i.npl:ovements  in design  c;;,f 
new plants a8  well as .i,n  systans and operation of existirig plants.  " 15 
3 .1.  INIROOOCTION 
Managemant of operation is very important to assuring nuclear safety. 
The  lesson.S  learned fran analysis of past incidents and accidents have 
.  increased the consciousness of the irnportance of the following factors: 
early  detection  of  faults,  man-machine  interface,  man-nan 
canprehension, etgonany,  persOilnel training and safety culture. 
'Ihese  various  Subjects  are to be  addressed  both  for no:mal  operation 
conditions  - fran cold  shut  down  to full ~,  including transients 
progranm::rl. or due to incidents  - for design basis accidents situatiOns 
and for situations leading .  up to severe accidents. 
As  far . as  the general  safety rules  are  concerned,  safety is treated, 
. f:n::rq  the  operation  point  of  view,  in a  similar  way,  in  the  ManQer 
~~- .  ~· 
3. 2.  GENERAL  OPERATni; RULES 
~  general operating rules, which :require· the awroval of the national 
safety autho:dties,  .. include in. particular: 
- technical operating specifications, 
- general; matters :relating to operating pn>eedw:es, 
- the .neasures  to be  taken in the event of incidents or accidents, 
- periodical test prograrmes for systans of safety significance. 
3 .3.  TOCHNICAL  oPERAT:rN; .  SPEX:IFicATret5 
Technical  q>eiating  specifications  define. the  technical  rules  to  be 
canplied with during different states of no:mal operation of the plant. 
'lhey:  - specify  the  safety  limits  of  1:he  parane~  taken  il'\to 
consideration at the design stage, which may not be exceeded.( 
- ·inp:>se  the  protection  thresholds  of  essential  protectipn 
systems,  which  trigger  an  autanatic  respoose  so  as to eJ'lSU1."e 
that the safety limits a:re not overridden.  '~~ 
..'.  specify the functional limits for start-up, {X)Wer  opercitien apd 
shut-down of a ~  plant.  ·  '· 
~ lay  down  the  neasu:res  to  be  taken  in  the  event  of  llCfJ-
availability of  one  or llD.re  equiptelts .  or  systems  or in 'tf!.e 
case of atno:mal changes in a  pa.ra:neter of safety significan~, 
for ~le  tine limit  for  a  unit to ratain in a  given state 
before :returning to What is deemad to be the safest state.  \: 
'  Technical  specifications  a:re  drawn ·up  on  the  basis  of  detenni.nistic 
criteria and 'with the  assistance of probabilistic assessments,  naki.ng 
use of the available :reliability data for main c:anponents. 
'lhese d.ocun"ents  a:re· very detailed and necessarily differ fran one plant 
to another 16 
3.4.  OOGANIZATIGI  OF  OPERATDG  EKPERI~  FEEDI:W:l< 
'lhe  aiin  in organizing operating experience  fea:iback  is to reduce  the 
f~cy  of incidents  in order to reduce the safety implications  and 
to  avoid  unn.ecessacy  shut  downs.  'lhe  main  objective  is  the 
identification of  incidents,  precursors  of llDre  serious accidents;  in 
order  to  define  and  apply  the  necessacy  oorrective  neasures  before 
these accidents occur.  · 
'lhe events  are collected in  databases~  in each  country;  and  selected 
events  are  sul:mitt:.erl  for  incorporation in intemational databases  and 
at  JRC  Ispra  in oroer to  allCM  s~ing of  information  and  in depth 
analysis of these events for the benefit of all participants. 
3 .5.  OPERATIOO  UNDER  N:lUW. CONDITIONS 
'lhe  situation is nearly .the  sane  in the. Member  States.  At  present, 
there is a tendency to  relieve  operating  staff  flDD  manual,  routine 
oontrol  functions  by  the  provision  of  operator  aids  li.ke  highly 
au~  ted  systems.  In  particular  the  impo.rtance  of  the  man-maChine 
inte:i:face  is  stressed  (control  room  organization,  alanns 
nana~t  •.. ). 
3.  6.  OPERATIOO  UNDER  INCIDENI'  .AND  ACCIDENr  CONDITIONS 
It is of  ut::nost  importance  to have  suitable  procedures  dealing  with 
incidents  and  accidents.  Ohe  important  point  is  the  oontrol  roan 
a:rran.gem:mts:  currently  no  operator  actiQn.  for· instance  is  foreseen 
during the first period of tine after a  ~ign  basis acc.i,.dent  (apoot .20 
to  30  minutes,. on average,  according tp the different designs},  and a 
computerisEd  infonriation  system  . presenting  cbncise ,  information 
:regarding plant safety conditions is foreseen.  · 
Another  pjint  is  to  take  appmpriate  nea.sureS  to  mitigate  $e 
consequenC"eS  of  severe accidents:  the pri.ne  objective being to en5\,J.re 
oontairnnent integrity.  '~ 
Coz:ita#ment  venting  and  filtering  is  being  st\Xlied  and  for  sc#,re 
eot'lntries  implemented.  The  hardware  neasures  are  supplemented  "PY 
aPftropriate procedures and training programnes.  ~ 
3.  7.  EMERGE:ro  PLANS 
Fach  nuclear sit9 ought  to have  an eoergency plan,  in ~ch  the ~ 
planned actions 6f the utility are described.  '!he main goals of ~ 
actiorls are:  " 
'  1. to alert  the  authorities· in the  event  of ·a nuclear accident to 
allow  thE!ll  to  implement.  the  ext.e:J::nal  emargency  plan  incl\Xling 
information  to  the  public  and  the  local  and  national  ene:gericy 
centres  <as appropriate).  · 
2.  to set up the utility arergency organization in order to: 
- help the oontrol roan staff in the managatent of the accident. 
- implemen.t on-site cind  off-site radiological neaslln:::nelts 
- infonn the authorities on the developrent of the accident. 
3.  to ensure the protection of w:>rkers. . ' 
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3 •  8 •  PERSONNEL  'IRAINJ1IG 
'!he  operator  role  is  essential  for  a  safe  operation  of  the  plants. 
Very high qualification must be assured and naintainerl continuously and 
precautions are to be  taken against  lowering of attention during  long 
operating periods without an incident. 
Consequently,  the  operator  training  both  for  nonnal  operation  and 
operation . under  fault  conditions  is of  gxeat  safety significance and 
systanatic training p:rogranmas using s.im.llators are very important. 
Indeed,  past  experience  has  shown  that a  serious  accident  invariably 
has a  "human  factor"  ccrrponent,  even if its origin lies in an equiprent 
failure. or an extemal event. .  '!he events at 'lMI  and Chemobyl provide 
ample  daronstration  of  this  fact. ·  Moreover  when  one  considers  not 
accidents  but . only  incidents  or  even  production  losses,  the  human 
factor has a  major involVE!IEllt,  vacying fran 30 to 60%  depending on the 
type of eyent in question. 
In  tlle  great  majority. of  cases,  appropriate  staff  training  oriented 
towards  t;he  situations encountered  would  have  eriablerl  these incidents 
to  be  avoided.  Training  is  theref01:e  of  utm:>st  importance  and 
priority. 
Nuclear ~  statioris  are canplex  .installations,  and  one  can  expect 
satisfactocy  perfonnance  fran  the  people  responsible  for  their 
operation  only  if  they  have  in  depth  knowledge  of  hCM  these 
installations  are  functioning.  '!he  trai.hi.ng  of  persohnel  tlie!:efore 
necessarily  involves  the  ac:::qui.sition  of  basic  knc:Mledge,  fqlli:Jwed  by 
practical  Ei>.xperience  and  familiarization  with  the. varioUS  mechanisms 
governing operation of the plant.  Regular retraining is also neieded · tO 
maintain and upjate the operator qualifications.  ;  .. 
Specialized::simulator ·training .is  necessacy,  being  regan:led  in  J.l'4fly 
~  as  nDre  profitable  than  training on  the plant  itsE:;lf. .  'ihe 
s.i.n1ul.a.tor  enables  the trainees to cope with distw::bed situations ~ 
\<VOlil.d  eneow1ter  only  rarely in actual  operation,  for  inst.moe  after 
st.art:...up  testing. 
3.9. cbto.usrON 
Safe  .  Operation  of  NPPs  requires  carrpliance  with  well  defined  ahd 
approved  technical  operating  specification,  existence  of  operat¥lg 
procedures  for  nonnal  and  accidental  conditions,  oz:ganizatic;n  iof 
operating  experience  feedback  and  first  of  all,·  qualifiErl  ~ 
adeg:uately traine:::i operators having always safety in the fore-front "bf 
their planning for action.  ·  ' 18 
'Ihe  safety of  NPPs  is  assw:a:i  by mat.hods  allowing  to fulfill safety 
objectives.  'lhree basic methods wem described for safe design and the 
.irnp:>rtance of a  rorrect managenent of operation was  stressoo. 
'lhese objectives and methods are at present the subject of a  consensus 
between  the  actors  - authorities,  manufacturers;  utilities  - in ~1 
Manber  Countries.  In the  implatentation of  the  ALARP  oonoept and  ·~  · 
the  importance  given  to probabilistic  assesSJlEllts  differences  exisJ:, 
mainly due  to the  speed at which new  technologies are adopted in tJ1e 
different cxnmtries.  · 
'  Finally,  the safety of NPPs  cannot be ronsidered as  scmething that ;j.s 
aCXIUired  once  and  for  all  following  acceptance  of  a  given  desigp. 
Rather,  safety is a  livi.ng oonoept whose nai.ntenance xequires :pet:pet;\¥.11 
vigilance  and  exploitation  of  experience  taking  acooont  .:pf 
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